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Erroneous and Veridical Recall Are Not Two Sides of the Same Coin:  
Evidence From Semantic Distraction in Free Recall 
Abstract   
Two experiments examined the extent to which erroneous recall blocks veridical 
recall using, as a vehicle for study, the disruptive impact of distractors that are semantically 
similar to a list of words presented for free recall. Instructing participants to avoid erroneous 
recall of to-be-ignored spoken distractors attenuated their recall but this did not influence the 
disruptive effect of those distractors on veridical recall (Experiment 1). Using an externalised 
output-editing procedure—whereby participants recalled all items that came to mind and 
identified those that were erroneous—the usual between-sequence semantic similarity effect 
on erroneous and veridical recall was replicated but the relationship between the rate of 
erroneous and veridical recall was weak (Experiment 2). The results suggest that forgetting is 
not due to veridical recall being blocked by similar events.  
 
Keywords: Erroneous Recall, Veridical Recall, Blocking, Semantic Distraction, Forewarning, 
Externalised Free Recall, Source Monitoring. 
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Many classical and contemporary theories of memory conceive of the process of 
retrieval as one of discriminating between targets and similar but task-irrelevant events, 
whether those irrelevant events were actually experienced or internally generated via their 
association with experienced events (Goh & Lu, 2012; Hunt, 2003; Nairne, 2006; Poirier, 
Nairne, Morin, Zimmermann, Koutmeridou, & Fowler, 2012; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Smith, Ward, Tindell, Sifonis, & Wilkenfeld, 2000; Watkins & Watkins, 1975; Wickens, 
Born, & Allen, 1963). Thus, the ability to retrieve information on the whereabouts of a car 
parked earlier in the day, for example, is a direct function of the extent to which, at retrieval, 
memory for that event is distinguished from memories of other similar but goal-irrelevant 
events and hence ones that are likely to cause interference (e.g., where the car was parked the 
day before; see M. C. Anderson & Neely, 1996). One widely-invoked mechanism to explain 
such interference-at-retrieval is associative blocking whereby the perseverative erroneous 
recall of retrieval-cue-matching but ultimately inappropriate events impairs access to the 
target event (Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012; Rundus, 1973; Spitzer & 
Bäuml, 2009). In the present article, we examine whether veridical recall is indeed 
determined by the tendency for (covert or overt) erroneous recall to block access to target 
representations by systematically overtaxing the discrimination-at-retrieval process: we 
present, during the encoding phase of a free recall task, distractor items drawn from the same 
semantic category as a list of (visually-presented) memoranda and ones that would therefore 
be expected to interfere at retrieval. A critical empirical feature of the setting for present 
purposes is that such distractors result not only in erroneous recall of the distractors (or 
‘intrusions’) but also a reduction in veridical free recall (Beaman, 2004; Beaman, 
Hanczacowski, Hodgetts, Marsh, & Jones, 2013; Bell, Buchner, & Mund, 2008; Marsh, 
Hughes, & Jones, 2008; Neely & LeCompte, 1999; Sörqvist, Marsh, & Jahncke, 2010). This 
double-impact of between-sequence semantic similarity (B-SSS) is exploited here as a means 
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of examining whether veridical recall is impaired as a function of blocking by similar-but-
irrelevant events. 
That the failure of recall—or forgetting—is due to the erroneous recall of retrieval-
cue-matching but contextually-inappropriate events blocking access to target events has long 
been a key explanatory construct in memory theory (J. R. Anderson, 1983; Mensink & 
Raaijmakers, 1988; McGeoch, 1942; Rundus, 1973; for an extended discussion, see M. C. 
Anderson & Neely, 1996). To take just two classic examples of the application of the 
blocking construct, in a typical paired-associate learning procedure, unrelated pairs of words 
(e.g., dog-rock) are studied and then presented in a later memory test whereby the cue dog 
can elicit the relevant target response rock. If, in the interim between study and test, re-
pairings are studied (e.g., dog-sky), such that two responses now share a retrieval cue (both 
rock and sky associated with the cue dog), this new learning interferes with memory for initial 
pairings (dog-rock; e.g., Postman, 1971). On the blocking account, this instance of retroactive 
interference results from the perseverative (covert or actual) erroneous recall of the 
competing response (i.e., sky) blocking retrieval of the target rock (e.g., Keppel, 1968; 
Postman, 1961; Postman & Underwood, 1973; Rundus, 1973). A second phenomenon for 
which a blocking account has been frequently be deployed is part-set cuing inhibition. Here, a 
list of words from each of several (e.g., semantic) categories is presented. If some of the 
exemplars from a studied category are provided as cues at test, recall of noncued exemplars 
of that category is impaired (relative to when no cues are given; Basden, Basden, & 
Galloway, 1977; Todres & Watkins, 1981). On the blocking account, cueing strengthens the 
association between the cued exemplars and the relevant category relative to the association 
between the category and the non-cued exemplars. This relative strength-advantage for cued 
exemplars results in those items intruding persistently, thereby blocking the retrieval of non-
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cued items (Rundus, 1973; see also Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012; 
Rosen & Engle, 1997; Spitzer & Bäuml, 2009).  
However, in all the foregoing cases, the inference that recall of the contextually-
inappropriate item causes the failure to retrieve the target item is indirect and hence not 
empirically verifiable. For instance, in the paired associate learning paradigm, when a 
second-pair response intrudes, it cannot be determined with certainty that the intrusion was 
the cause of the failure to recall the first-pair response. Similarly, in part-set cuing inhibition, 
there is no direct evidence that cued items are indeed covertly recalled perseveratively or, 
even if they are, that this causes the impairment in the recall of non-cued items. In each case, 
the accessibility of the desired item(s) may be reduced for reasons other than erroneous recall 
of the competing item(s) (see M. C. Anderson & Neely, 1996). Indeed, the indirect nature of 
the evidence for associative blocking has meant that phenomena that have classically been 
attributed to blocking have been readily amenable to non-blocking type accounts (M. C. 
Anderson, 2003; M. C. Anderson & Neely, 1996; Huddleston & M. C. Anderson, 2012; 
Hulbert, Shivde, & M. C. Anderson, 2012). For example, part-set cueing inhibition has been 
explained without recourse to blocking by supposing that the provision of cues leads to the 
abandonment of a whole-list retrieval strategy in favor of a less effective part-list retrieval 
strategy (Basden & Basden, 1995; for an alternative non-blocking account, see Bäuml & 
Aslan, 2004). Similarly, retroactive interference in the paired-associate learning paradigm has 
been reascribed to a process in which competing items trigger a competitor-inhibition process 
which incurs an overhead cost for concurrent target recall as well as impaired subsequent 
retrieval of inhibited items (e.g., M. C. Anderson, 2003; M. C. Anderson & Neely, 1996; see 
also Postman, Stark, and Fraser’s (1968) notion of response-set suppression). 
What is required, therefore, to address the fundamental question of whether erroneous 
recall determines the probability of veridical recall is a setting in which the rates of erroneous 
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and veridical recall are both directly observable and, in principle, free to vary orthogonally so 
that any relation that might exist between them can be observed. At first glance, the classic 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm seems to meet this objective. In this paradigm, 
when a list of items (e.g., bed, tired, snore…) is presented, all associated with a critical, non-
presented, word (e.g., sleep), participants tend to erroneously recall that critical lure (Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Thus, the rate at which the critical lure is erroneously 
recalled can be measured independently of the rate of recall for the target items and hence the 
relation between them is also, in principle, discernible. However, the DRM procedure is 
likely to be too blunt a tool for addressing our question because only the erroneous recall (or 
not) of just one critical lure is measured in this case. Indeed, this may account for why a 
variety of erroneous-veridical recall relations have been observed in this setting, with some 
studies showing dissociations between rates of erroneous and veridical recall—i.e., the 
absence of any relation—such as a reduction in erroneous recall in the absence of any change 
in the rate of veridical recall (Hanczakowski & Mazzoni, 2011; McCabe & Smith, 2006; 
Schacter et al., 1999) or veridical recall varying independently of erroneous recall (Schacter, 
Verfaellie, & Pradere, 1996; McEvoy & Nelson, 1998; Norman & Schacter, 1997). However, 
these results are inconclusive since other studies have shown a negative correlation between 
veridical and erroneous recall (e.g., McDermott, 1996), and still others have shown a positive 
correlation (e.g., Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; Toglia, 1999).  
In the present study, therefore, we use a distraction procedure in which multiple 
‘lures’ can potentially be erroneously recalled during a free recall task so as to promote the 
chances of observing a relation between erroneous and veridical recall if one exists. In the 
typical semantic distraction study (e.g., Marsh et al., 2008), participants view a visually-
presented list of items that are members of the same category (e.g., Furniture: chair, desk, 
wardrobe…) and are asked to recall them in any order when presented with a ‘recall’ prompt. 
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To-be-ignored spoken words (distractors)—that are either taken from the same semantic 
category as the targets (e.g., “table, sofa, bookshelf…”) or from a different semantic category 
(e.g., Professions: “nurse, secretary, carpenter...”)—are presented concurrently with the list of 
targets (or, in some studies, during a retention interval between the last target and a recall 
cue; e.g., Marsh et al., 2008). Despite explicit instructions to ignore the distractors and to 
avoid guessing at recall, B-SSS exerts two deleterious effects on performance. First, 
erroneous recall—or extra-list intrusions—are increased: words presented as semantically-
similar distractors are erroneously recalled at a greater rate than spontaneous erroneous recall 
of those words (i.e., when those words are not presented as distractors; Beaman, 2004; Bell et 
al., 2008). Second, B-SSS impairs the recall of target items (i.e., reduced veridical recall). 
One interpretation of these two effects is that they reveal the action of associative blocking: it 
is the erroneous recall of the distractors that directly causes the disruptive effect of those 
distractors on veridical recall (Beaman et al., 2013; Hanczakowski et al., 2012). The starting 
point for this blocking account is the uncontroversial notion that in settings in which target-
items are related to one another (e.g., by semantic category) the shared categorical 
information is used as a retrieval cue (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
1
 The B-
SSS effects occur because in the semantically-related condition the distractors also match the 
cue. This distractor-cue match, coupled to the fallibility of the capacity to discriminate the 
environmental source of those items (e.g., auditorily- as opposed to visually-presented, e.g., 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001), leads to those 
items being retrieved as potential (but inappropriate) candidates for output. Such erroneous 
                                                 
1
 Whilst there was an initial suggestion that the false recalls generated from associatively structured lists and 
categorically structured lists are underpinned by two distinct monitoring mechanisms, one operable at study (for 
associatively structured lists) and one operable at test (for categorically-structured lists; Smith, Gerkens, Pierce, 
& Choi, 2002), false recall for both list structures is similarly modulated by factors such as modality of 
presentation (Pierce, Gallo, Weiss, & Schacter, 2005), blocking of items at study and instruction to generate 
associates (Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & Thorley, 2009). This coheres with the notion that “associative illusions” 
in the DRM procedure constitute a reflection of semantic gist processing (e.g., Brainerd, Yang, Reyna, Howe, & 
Mills, 2008; see also Knott, Dewhurst, & Howe, 2012). 
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retrieval of distractor-items simultaneously blocks the retrieval of target items, thereby 
leading also to a decrease in veridical recall. Recent support for the blocking account comes 
from the finding that a single factor can beneficially affect both erroneous and veridical recall 
in this setting. For example, using a version of the semantic distraction paradigm in which 
both targets and distractors were spoken, Beaman et al. (2013, Experiment 1) found that 
promoting the capacity to discriminate perceptually between the targets and related 
distractors by presenting them in different voices—targets in a male voice and distractors in a 
female voice as opposed to all in the same voice—resulted both in fewer erroneous recalls 
and less impairment of veridical recall. 
However, such co-variation of erroneous and veridical recall does not necessarily 
indicate that the B-SSS effects are underpinned by a single, blocking, mechanism. Other 
studies have shown dissociations between erroneous and veridical recall in this context: 
Erroneous recall is reduced markedly when the related distractors are presented during a 
retention interval between the last target and a recall cue but this has relatively little effect on 
veridical recall (Marsh et al., 2008; Sörqvist et al., 2010). Furthermore, older adults show a 
more pronounced B-SSS on erroneous recall compared to younger adults but not on veridical 
recall (Bell et al., 2008). Finally, there is no correlation—either positive or negative—
between the extent to which an individual shows a B-SSS on erroneous recall and the extent 
to which that individual shows a B-SSS on veridical recall (Marsh et al., 2008). 
Such dissociations between erroneous and veridical recall are more consistent with a 
two-mechanism account of the impact of B-SSS (e.g., Marsh et al., 2008) and hence, by 
extension, with the view that erroneous recall per se is not a major determinant of veridical 
recall. On this account, whereas the increase in erroneous recall is again attributed to use of a 
semantic-category cue at retrieval coupled with poor source-discrimination (as in the single-
mechanism account), the impairment of veridical recall is thought to be causally unrelated to 
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erroneous recall. Specifically, one prominent suggestion is that impaired veridical recall 
reflects competition from the distractors at the point of their presentation (hereafter: 
immediate competition) rather than the retrieval of those distractors as potential output 
candidates at test: Semantically-related distractors interfere with the semantic-based encoding 
and organization processes that are pressed into action to support the later retrieval of the 
target-items (Marsh et al., 2008, 2009). Some of the impairment of veridical recall may also 
be attributable to an overhead cost of inhibiting the distractors as they occur: By this view, 
the inhibition of a competitive (i.e., semantically-related) distractor spreads via a semantic 
network (e.g., Neumann & DeSchepper, 1992) to semantically related targets thereby 
reducing the probability of veridical recall (Marsh, Beaman, Hughes, & Jones, 2012; Marsh 
et al., 2008, 2009; Marsh, Sörqvist, Hodgetts, Beaman, & Jones, 2014). Support for this 
immediate competition view comes from a recent study by Marsh et al. (2012) using a 
negative priming procedure (e.g., Tipper, 1985): If the target items on trial n are the same as 
the semantically-related (and hence competitive) distractors on trial n – 1, veridical recall is 
poorer than when there is no relation between the distractors and targets across the two trials 
(see also Marsh et al., 2014). Based on the inhibitory account of negative priming (e.g., 
Tipper, 2001), this reduction in veridical recall reflects the fact that the target items had 
recently been inhibited due to their offering immediate competition as distractors on the 
previous trial.  
In the present study, we address the question of whether erroneous recall determines 
the probability of veridical recall by seeking to determine definitively whether appealing to a 
single (e.g., blocking) mechanism is sufficient to explain the impact of B-SSS on both 
erroneous and veridical recall (Beaman et al., 2013; Hanczakowski et al., 2012) or whether, 
instead, some other mechanism must be invoked to explain the reduction in veridical recall 
(regardless of the specific nature of that second mechanism). To preview the logic of the 
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present series, in Experiment 1 we introduce for the first time into the semantic distraction 
setting a technique used previously in the context of the DRM false memory paradigm 
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995): We warned participants about the tendency for 
erroneously recalling items presented as distractors. In line with a dual-mechanism account, 
we will show that whereas forewarning reduces the impact of B-SSS on erroneous recall, it 
leaves its impact on veridical recall unaffected. In Experiment 2, we go on to test a possibility 
that could potentially provide a reprieve for the blocking account: We examine whether the 
reliance on measuring overt erroneous recall in the standard free recall protocol used in 
Experiment 1—as well as all previous semantic distraction/free recall studies (e.g., Beaman, 
2004; Beaman et al., 2013; Bell et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2008; Sörqvist et al., 2010)—might 
obscure an actual relation between erroneous and veridical recall. Specifically, many 
instances of erroneous recall may be edited out just prior to overt output—and hence remain 
undetected in the standard procedure—and at a point at which they could have already 
exerted their negative impact on veridical recall. In Experiment 2, therefore, we will examine 
whether, in the usual free recall procedure, covert instances of erroneous recall in the face of 
B-SSS might underpin the impairment of veridical recall. 
Experiment 1 
Providing a forewarning about erroneous recall of the critical lure in the DRM 
procedure reduces such erroneous recall (Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon, 
1997; Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 2001; McDermott & Roediger, 1998; Neuschatz, 
Lynn, Benoit, & Payne, 2003; Watson, Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005). Whilst this 
reduction does not affect veridical recall, as discussed above, it would be unsafe to infer from 
this dissociation that erroneous recall does not dictate veridical recall generally given the 
likely insensitivity of the single-lure design of the DRM task in relation to this issue. For 
example, the possibility of finding a statistically significant correlation between erroneous 
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recall and veridical recall—negative or positive—is undermined by the low number of critical 
lures that can possibly be recalled in this paradigm. In Experiment 1, therefore, we introduced 
a forewarning manipulation in the context of the semantic distraction (‘multiple-lure’) setting, 
which is methodologically sounder that the DRM paradigm for investigating the particular 
research question of concern here. The blocking account would posit that any reduction in 
erroneous recall of the distractors by the provision of a forewarning should also exert a 
facilitative effect on veridical recall (Beaman et al., 2013; Hanczakowski et al., 2012). In 
contrast, according to a two-mechanism account (e.g., Marsh et al., 2008), the B-SSS effect 
on veridical recall should be independent of the degree to which the warning reduces 
erroneous recall, because these components are argued to be underpinned by two distinct 
mechanisms.  
Method 
Participants. Forty eight students at the University of Central Lancashire participated 
for £6 each. All were native English speakers and reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and normal hearing. The participants were randomly divided into two 24-participant 
groups: Warning and No Warning. 
Materials and Design. The experiment was run using E-Prime software. Each 
participant received 18 trials in which they were visually-presented with 15 to-be-
remembered words (targets) all drawn from a single semantic category. Auditory distractors 
were presented synchronously with the targets. Distractors were either all drawn from the 
same category as the targets or all drawn from a different category.   
Targets appeared centrally on the computer screen in black 72-point Times font on a 
white background at a rate of one every 1.5s (750ms on, 750ms inter-stimulus interval; ISI). 
Distractors were presented over stereo headphones at 65dB(A) and at a rate of one every 1.5s 
(750ms on, 750ms ISI). The distractors were digitally recorded in a male voice at an even-
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pitch and sampled with a 16-bit resolution at a sampling rate of 44.1 kHz using Sound Forge 
5.  
Fifteen words were chosen from each of 36 semantic categories taken from the Van 
Overschelde, Rawson and Dunlosky (2004) category norms. Items from odd-ranked positions 
in the category-norm lists were assigned to the target lists and items from even positions were 
distractors. The 36 selected categories were first arranged into pairs of unrelated categories 
(e.g., “Fruit-Carpenter’s Tools”). There was one experimental block of 18 trials: 9 related and 
9 unrelated. On the related trials, the auditory distractors were taken from the same category 
as the targets. On unrelated trials, the distractors were taken from the semantically-unrelated 
category (e.g., “Fruit”) that was paired with the target category (“Carpenter’s Tools”).  
The presentation order of exemplars within each to-be-remembered and distractor 
sequence was random but identical for each participant. Half received a semantically-related 
trial first followed by a semantically-unrelated trial (with trials alternating thereafter between 
related and unrelated). This order was reversed for the other half of the participants. 
Categories were assigned such that, across participants, there was an equal likelihood of each 
category appearing in the unrelated or related condition. 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in soundproof booths and were 
seated at a distance of approximately 60 cm from the PC monitor. Participants wore 
headphones throughout the experiment. Participants began by reading standardized 
instructions and were told specifically that they should ignore the distractor words, that they 
would not be asked anything about them during the experiment, and to focus on memorizing 
the visually presented items. The target words were presented one at a time on the computer 
screen. After all 15 targets had been presented the prompt “recall” appeared on the screen. 
Participants then had 60 s to recite, in any order, as many of the target words as they could 
remember. Participants’ oral responses were recorded via microphone input into Audacity 
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software (SourceForge). Pressing the space-bar initiated presentation of the next list. One 
practice trial (in quiet) was given at the start of the experiment. 
Participants in the Warning group were told that on some of the trials the distractor 
words would be semantically related to the to-be-recalled words and that these trials were 
designed to elicit erroneous recalls of the distractor words which were never presented 
visually and hence never task-relevant. Participants were encouraged to avoid outputting any 
distractor words. The instructions were made more concrete by the presentation of a trial in 
which an example category (written color-words) were presented as to-be-recalled and 
distractor words and the participants were told during test which items were the to-be-
recalled were and which were the distractor words. Hence, if warned participants suspected 
that an available word had an auditory origin, it would be veridical to distinguish and 
withhold this word during free recall. 
Results 
Erroneous recall. A response that matched one of the fifteen items from the even 
positions in the Van Overschelde et al. (2004) norms (that were presented as distractors on 
related trials) was scored as an intrusion (i.e., erroneous recall). The same was also done for 
the unrelated condition (in which those items were not presented); this measure of the 
‘spontaneous’ erroneous recall of these items when not actually presented provides the most 
appropriate baseline for assessing the extent to which erroneous recall is exacerbated by the 
actual presentation of the distractor items (see Beaman, 2004; Marsh et al., 2008). Figure 1 
(Panel A) shows the mean number of intrusions for each condition. The rate of erroneous 
recall was clearly greater in the related compared to unrelated condition but this difference 
was attenuated dramatically in the Warning group.  
A 2 (Warning) × 2 (Target-Distractor Relation) ANOVA of the intrusion data 
revealed a main effect of Target-Distractor Relation, F(1, 46) = 50.25, MSE = 3.95, p < .001, 
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p
2
 = .52, a main effect of Warning, F(1, 46) = 5.83, MSE = 12.60, p = .02, p
2
 = .113, and a 
significant interaction between these two factors, F(1, 46) = 14.45, MSE = 3.95, p < .001, p
2
 
= .24. A simple effects analysis (LSD) revealed that intrusions were more frequent in the 
related condition than in the unrelated condition for both the No Warning (p = .025; CI.95 = 
.179, 2.49) and Warning (p < .001; CI.95 = 3.26, 5.57) groups. More importantly, the Warning 
group produced significantly fewer intrusions in the related condition compared to the No 
Warning group (p = .002; CI.95 = 1.27, 5.32), while there was no significant difference 
between the groups in the unrelated condition (p = .73, CI.95 = -1.01, 1.43).  
Veridical recall. Recall of the target items was scored according to a free recall 
criterion: Each target (i.e., visually-presented) item recalled was scored as veridical 
regardless of its position. As can be seen in Figure 1 (Panel B), the basic effect of B-SSS on 
veridical recall was replicated: target items were recalled less well in the related compared to 
unrelated condition. Most importantly, whereas forewarning strongly modulated the impact 
of semantic similarity on erroneous recall, this did not in turn affect veridical recall: Whilst 
there was a large and specific effect of forewarning on erroneous recall of related distractors, 
there was a small (and non-significant; see below) non-specific effect of forewarning on 
veridical recall (i.e., regardless of Target-Distractor relation). 
A 2 (Warning: Warning versus No Warning) × 2 (Target-Distractor Relation: Related 
versus Unrelated) ANOVA of the target-recall data revealed a main effect of Target-
Distractor Relation, F(1, 46) = 54.90, MSE = 0.002, p < .001, p
2
 = .54, but no main effect of 
Warning, F(1, 46) = .725, MSE = 0.009, p = .399, p
2
 = .02, and no interaction between these 
two factors, F(1, 46) = .109, MSE = 0.002, p = .74, p
2
 = .002.  
Relation between veridical and erroneous recall. There were also no significant 
correlations between the number of intrusions and the probability of veridical recall 
regardless of distractor-relatedness or Warning group, r(22) = -.17, p = .42, related condition, 
Erroneous and Veridical Recall       15 
 
no warning; r(22) = .127, p = .56, unrelated condition, no warning; r(22) = .13, p = .54, 
related condition with warning; r(22) = -.26, p = .22, unrelated condition, no warning).  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 showed that a forewarning about the tendency to erroneously recall 
semantically-related auditory distractors during free recall reduces substantially the 
propensity for such erroneous recall. The result resonates with that found in the DRM task in 
which a critical lure is less likely to be falsely recalled when participants are forewarned that 
such erroneous recall tends to occur (e.g., Hicks & Marsh, 1999; McCabe & Smith, 2002; 
Watson et al., 2005). Of particular significance for the present purposes is the finding that 
while warning reduced erroneous recall it did not in turn affect veridical recall. Furthermore, 
regardless of condition, there was no correlation between the rate of erroneous recall and the 
accuracy of veridical recall. Thus, the results of Experiment 1 more clearly support a two-
mechanism account (Marsh et al., 2008), which ascribes the effects of B-SSS on erroneous 
and veridical recall to distinct mechanisms, over a single-mechanism account in which the 
reduction in veridical recall is caused by distractors blocking the retrieval of target items 
(Hanczakowski et al., 2012; see also Beaman et al., 2013). The data also go against the 
possibility that veridical and erroneous recall are both direct consequences of a single 
response bias or threshold at output (cf. signal detection theory; e.g., Banks, 1970). More 
generally, the results of Experiment 1 are in line with the broader view that erroneous recall 
is not a key determinant of veridical recall (e.g., M. C. Anderson, 2003). 
 However, to conclude that the absence of a relation between the impact of B-SSS on 
erroneous and veridical recall as observed in Experiment 1 undermines the blocking account 
may be premature. First, there are known logical and statistical problems in drawing 
conclusions from an absence of evidence, even though a dual mechanism might seem the 
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most plausible of the alternatives given the results obtained. Second, it remains possible that a 
blocking effect of erroneous recall on veridical recall does indeed account for the disruptive 
effect of B-SSS on veridical recall but, in the standard free recall procedure, this does not 
manifest empirically in the participants’ recall protocols. Specifically, many instances of 
erroneous recall may remain unobserved because they are edited out by the participants prior 
to overt responding (Hunt, Smith, & Dunlap, 2012; Kahana et al., 2005). If so, this could 
result in an underestimation of erroneous recall and hence, potentially, explain the failure to 
observe the systematic relation between erroneous and veridical recall predicted by the 
blocking account. Experiment 2 was designed to examine this possibility. 
Experiment 2 
The key conclusion from Experiment 1—that the impact of B-SSS on erroneous recall 
is not related to its effect on veridical recall—seems to apply when erroneous recall is defined 
as overt output of distractor items. However, ‘erroneous recall’ could instead be defined less 
restrictively as items that enter consciousness and become available for output during test 
regardless of whether they are actually output. To date, articulations of the blocking account 
have tended to emphasize the fallibility of “front-end control” aspects of the retrieval process. 
Front-end control—an example of which is source-constrained retrieval (e.g., Jacoby, 
Shimizu, Velanova, & Rhodes, 2005)—operates by focussing retrieval such that it is mainly 
information from the desired source that comes to mind during test. This is achieved by 
reinstating the source context that specifically fits the way in which target information was 
encoded, and thereby potentially limits the accessibility of undesired information. In other 
words, the retrieval of targets is facilitated and potential intrusions are prevented from 
coming to mind during the test phase of the task. Hence, front-end control is often referred to 
as a pre-retrieval process. An example of the operation of front-end control in the present 
setting would be to constrain search to items whose visual properties (e.g., orthography) were 
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utilised during the encoding episode thereby preventing irrelevant spoken items from coming 
to mind at test. Imperfect operation of such front-end control leads to the retrieval of 
distractor-items, thence to erroneous recall and finally to the blocking of access to target-
items (resulting in poorer veridical recall; Beaman et al., 2013).  
However, it is also commonly accepted that there are “back-end control” mechanisms 
such as the distinctiveness heuristic (Dodson & Schacter, 2002) or recollection rejection 
(Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003) that operate subsequent to (covert) retrieval but 
before output to assess the appropriateness of outputting a given item (e.g., Halamish, 
Goldsmith, & Jacoby, 2012). Once (covertly) retrieved, an item—or its associated features—
is evaluated in terms of whether it can be differentiated as a target or an intrusion (e.g., an 
item presented as a distractor; Budson et al., 2005). An example of back-end control would 
be to covertly generate items presented as distractors but then edit the item after it has been 
retrieved on the basis of an assessment of the features associated with the item (e.g., modality 
information; recall of auditory information and/or failure to recall visual information).  
Importantly, the possible existence of back-end control mechanisms means that 
whereas there may not be a relation between overt erroneous recall and veridical recall (cf. 
Experiment 1), a relation may indeed exist between erroneous and veridical recall if covert—
and not just overt—instances of erroneous recall are taken into account. Such a relation 
would clearly provide a reprieve for the blocking account. Specifically, the account could 
posit that covert retrieval of items presented as distractors (or ‘covert erroneous recall’) 
blocks the retrieval of target items regardless of whether such covert erroneous recall 
translates into overt erroneous recall. In short, using only the rate of overt erroneous recall—
as measured in Experiment 1 and all previous studies of the B-SSS effect—may obscure a 
true relation between erroneous recall (covert or overt) and veridical recall. 
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What is required for a fairer test of the blocking account, therefore, is a means of 
assessing the extent to which erroneous recall in the face of B-SSS is related to the level of 
veridical recall regardless of whether that erroneous recall is overt or covert. To do this, we 
used a modified externalised free recall editing technique (Bousfield & Rosner, 1970; Kahana 
et al., 2005; Roediger & Payne, 1985; Rosen & Engle, 1997; Unsworth & Brewer, 2010). 
Here, participants are encouraged to overtly produce any word that enters consciousness 
during test, be it a previously produced response or an intrusion, but they are instructed to 
press a button if they recognize the item as a repetition or intrusion (Kahana et al., 2005; 
Unsworth & Brewer, 2010). Participants are thus encouraged to use back-end control to 
monitor and edit the output of each item after the response has been output. In the present 
context, then, this technique should enable us to infer the extent to which, in the standard 
(i.e., non-externalized) free recall task, semantically-related distractors are subject to covert 
erroneous recall but edited out before output. In turn, this will allow us to assess whether the 
impact of B-SSS on veridical recall is indeed related to the rate of (covert or overt) erroneous 
recall as predicted by the blocking account. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty Cardiff University students participated for course credit. All 
were native English speakers and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal 
hearing. 
Materials, design, & procedure. The remaining aspects of the method were the same 
as for Experiment 1 with the exception that participants were instructed to output any word 
that came to mind during the test phase and there was no warning manipulation. However, 
participants were also told that if a word that they had just output had not been a visually-
presented to-be-recalled item they were to classify it as an intrusion by pressing a key on the 
desk in front of them immediately after outputting the word but prior to outputting any 
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further items. Participants’ oral responses were recorded via microphone input into Sound 
Forge 5 software (Sonic Inc., Madison, WI; 2000).  
Results and Discussion 
The B-SSS effect on erroneous and veridical recall. Experiment 2 replicated the 
typical B-SSS effect on erroneous recall (Table 1): Erroneous recall was greater in the related 
condition than in the unrelated condition, t(19) = 5.63, p < .001, CI.95 = 0.67, 1.46, and this 
was the case regardless of whether those erroneously recalled items were correctly classified 
as intrusions (i.e., hits)
1
, t(19) = 3.12, p = .006, CI.95 = 0.19, 0.96, or not classified as 
intrusions (i.e., misses), t(19) = 3.51, p = .002, CI.95 = 0.11, 0.43. The results also showed the 
typical B-SSS effect on veridical recall (Table 1). In a first step, all targets that were output 
(regardless of their subsequent classification) were scored as correct. Overall, recall was 
worse in the related condition compared with the unrelated condition, t(19) = 2.45, p = .024, 
CI.95 = 0.07, 0.95. Veridical recall was also impaired in the related condition when only 
targets that were correctly rejected as not being intrusions (i.e., correct rejections) were 
considered, t(19) = 4.03, p < .001, CI.95 = 1.19, 0.38. Table 1 also reports the rest of the data 
for the sake of completeness. 
Relation between erroneous and veridical recall. If erroneous recall blocks 
veridical recall, there should be a negative correlation between erroneous recall— 
regardless of whether it was covert or overt—and veridical recall. That is, in the related 
condition, the more distractor items that come to mind the fewer the number of targets that 
should be produced. On the other hand, if erroneous recall and veridical recall are 
underpinned by functionally distinct mechanisms, we should find no correlation between 
them. As can be seen in Figure 2, there was no significant correlation between non-edited 
erroneous recall and veridical recall, r(18) = .06, p = .802. As this conclusion rests on 
acceptance of the null hypothesis, and the sample size was relatively small, we also report the 
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Bayes statistic for this result (http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor), because it can, unlike 
conventional statistics, quantify the support for the null hypothesis based on the obtained 
data. The JZS Bayes factor for the correlation between erroneous recall and veridical recall 
was 5.84. Values above unity are in favor of the null hypothesis, whereas values below unity 
are in favor of the alternative. A value of 5.84 is considered ‘substantial evidence in favour of 
the null-hypothesis’ (Jeffreys, 1961). 
 Experiment 2 replicated the typical B-SSS effect on erroneous and veridical recall. 
The findings provide evidence for the view that there is no relation between erroneous and 
veridical recall. There is no evidence in the results obtained here that the process of non-
target items coming to mind blocks the retrieval of targets. Although we acknowledge that 
the sample size of Experiment 2 was relatively small, the Bayesian analysis, combined with 
the consistency with the results of Experiment 1, bolster our confidence in this conclusion. 
Taken together, our results suggest that the B-SSS effect on erroneous recall and that on 
veridical recall are underpinned by distinct mechanisms. 
General Discussion 
To summarize the results of the present study, we showed that the impairment in the 
ability to free-recall a list of words due to the presence of semantically-related distractors is 
independent of the propensity to erroneously recall those distractors: The effect of 
semantically-related distractors persists even when erroneous recall is drastically reduced by 
a forewarning about the propensity for such recall (Experiment 1) and there is no relation 
between erroneous and veridical recall even when participants are encouraged to output all 
items that come-to-mind prior to classifying them according to whether or not they were 
intrusions (Experiment 2). These results are at odds with the single-mechanism (blocking) 
account of the B-SSS effect as it posits that retrieval of target items is disrupted by 
semantically-related distractors because the erroneous recall of those distractors blocks access 
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to target items (Beaman et al., 2013; Hanczakowski et al., 2012). On this account, the effect 
of related distractors on veridical recall should be attenuated when erroneous recall is 
constrained, and the rate of erroneous recall should be negatively associated with the rate of 
veridical recall. Instead, the results support a two-mechanism account (Marsh et al., 2008) in 
which the B-SSS effect on erroneous recall and on veridical recall occurs for different 
reasons. By extension, the present findings suggest more generally that forgetting is not 
driven to any appreciable extent by erroneous recall of similar but contextually-inappropriate 
events, contrary to several theories of memory (e.g., J. R. Anderson, 1983; Mensink & 
Raaijmakers, 1988; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Rundus, 1973). 
Erroneous and Veridical Recall Dissociated 
On both the single- and two-mechanism accounts, the erroneous recall component of 
the impact of B-SSS is attributed to the breakdown of source monitoring (Beaman, 2004; Bell 
et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2008). Some of the distractor items—those not successfully 
inhibited during their presentation (see later discussion of the second mechanism in the two-
mechanism account)—come to mind at test and undergo a monitoring process to determine 
whether or not they are appropriate for output. That a forewarning about the propensity for 
erroneous recall of distractors dramatically reduces such recall suggests that it can be 
prevented via back-end control. This resonates strongly with findings from the DRM 
procedure in which a warning about false recall of a single critical lure—a non-presented 
item strongly associated with target items—reduces recall of that lure (e.g., Hicks & Marsh, 
1999; Watson et al., 2005). According to this source-monitoring view, non-target items can 
potentially be edited out through a strategy of examining, post retrieval, the details that 
differentiate the non-target item from target items (see Budson et al., 2005).  
Typically, to examine the selection of targets from a “consideration set” of 
possibilities (Beaman, 2013), manipulations are implemented that impact on the 
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discriminability of target and distractor items (e.g., Beaman et al., 2013). In the study 
reported here, output monitoring processes were manipulated by means of instruction alone, 
and the dimension along which targets could be discriminated from distractors (modality) 
remained unchanged. The finding that a mere instructional manipulation—forewarning—
influences erroneous recall, suggests that in this case the observed reduction in erroneous 
recall is unlikely to be due to changes in front-end control. This is because this form of 
control operates by focussing retrieval such that it is mainly information from the desired 
source (e.g., visual properties such as orthography) that is used to prevent irrelevant spoken 
items from coming to mind during test (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2005). However, if front-end 
control was operating, then erroneous and veridical recall should be two sides of the same 
coin: factors that increase the effectiveness of front-end discrimination, like physical (non-
semantic) discriminability of relevant and irrelevant information, should lead to both fewer 
instances of erroneous recall and improved veridical recall (Beaman et al., 2013). However, a 
note of caution must be added here since we cannot exclude the possibility that participants, 
having been given a sample trial in the forewarning condition, focused on the orthographic 
information at study during the experimental trials to aid discrimination of targets and 
distractors via front-end control. Although there was a tendency for forewarning to reduce 
veridical recall in Experiment 1, as might be expected if maintenance of the warning cue 
acted as a load (cf. Watson et al., 2005), this did not reach significance and further suggests 
that erroneous recall was reduced by back- not front-end control. Thus, one way to account 
for the finding that physical manipulations that involve increasing the discriminability of 
targets from distractors (via differences in voice or color) can affect both veridical and 
erroneous recall (Beaman et al., 2013) is to propose that the physical distinction facilitates the 
identification of the distractors as such at the point at which they occur thereby facilitating 
the inhibition of inappropriate information. The action of successful inhibition in this context, 
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therefore, is to decrease erroneous recall of the distractors while increasing veridical recall of 
targets. 
Regardless of whether or not instances of erroneous recall are successfully edited out 
via back-end control, the present findings suggest strongly that these do not determine the 
probability of veridical recall, contrary to predictions derived from the construct of 
associative blocking (Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012; Rundus, 1973; 
Spitzer & Bäuml, 2009). The two-mechanism account proposes that veridical recall is 
impaired by distractors because they compete at the time of their presentation for the 
semantic-based processes supporting performance of the focal task (Marsh et al., 2008, 
2009). To counteract this competition, related distractors are subject to an inhibitory process 
as they occur. Whilst the net result of such inhibition is the facilitation of selective attention 
of the target items, the process of inhibiting incurs some overhead cost due to the spreading 
of the inhibition from semantically-related distractors to features shared with target items 
thereby diminishing their accessibility at test (Marsh et al., 2008, 2009, 2012, 2014; see also 
Jones, Marsh, & Hughes, 2012). Whilst the present study was not designed to garner direct 
evidence for this competition-at-presentation/inhibition view, as noted in the Introduction, it 
enjoys support from the finding that the free recall of items that have recently been distractors 
is impaired (i.e., negative priming; Marsh et al., 2012). Recent evidence suggests further that 
the precise mechanism of disruption of veridical recall may differ depending on individual 
differences in working memory capacity (WMC): veridical recall of those low in WMC (and 
hence low distractor-inhibition ability; Conway et al., 2001; Conway, Tuholski, Shisler, & 
Engle, 1999) seems to be disrupted primarily by the distractor-competition itself whereas the 
veridical recall of those with high WMC is impaired—although to a lesser extent than those 
with low WMC—due to an overhead cost of inhibiting the competitors. Corroborating 
evidence for this analysis comes from the fact that those with high WMC show a greater 
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negative priming effect than those with low WMC (Marsh et al., 2014). However, since in 
Experiment 2 the impact of B-SSS also manifested in an increased number of targets that 
were and incorrectly classified as intrusions, retrieval discriminability may also play some 
role in the B-SSS effect on veridical recall but not via a blocking mechanism.  
A Role for Attentional Capture? 
Evidence has been provided for a two-mechanism account of semantic auditory 
distraction, within which the exact processes operating in relation to the disruption of 
veridical recall remain open for debate. It is possible that some of the disruptive effect of 
semantically-related speech on free recall may be due to attentional capture whereby the 
distractors draw scarce attentional resources away from the encoding of the target items (cf. 
Cowan, 1995). There is again the possibility that attentional capture could affect veridical and 
erroneous recall in different ways. For example, erroneous recalls may be caused by 
attentional capture during study: Orientation of attention toward the distractors could result in 
the distractors being automatically encoded along with the target items. Moreover, if 
activation of the items per se (in the absence of the use of source-monitoring) is used to 
determine list membership, then this automatic encoding could feasibly result in the output of 
the distractors during test. Previous research (Conway et al., 2001) has demonstrated that 
salient semantic information captures attention. For example, in a shadowing task in which 
participants continuously repeat aloud a message presented to one ear while ignoring another 
message presented to the other ear, about a third of participants hear their own name in the to-
be-ignored channel. Perhaps it is no coincidence, therefore, that participants with high WMC 
make fewer intrusions of related spoken distractors in the semantic distraction task (Beaman, 
2004) and are less likely to make shadowing mistakes, or hear their name at the time it is 
presented, in the to-be-ignored channel in the context of dichotic listening (Conway et al., 
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2001). In essence, individuals with high WMC show stronger inhibition of information in a 
task-irrelevant auditory channel (Marsh et al., 2014; Sörqvist, Rönnberg, & Stenfelt, 2012). 
However, not all spoken distractors are accurately edited even with a forewarning 
about erroneous recall. One possibility is that intrusions may be due (in part) to attentional 
slippage (the allocation of attention, perhaps without intention, to the irrelevant items) and 
attentional leakage (semantic processing of irrelevant material whilst attention is focused 
elsewhere; Lachter, Forster, & Ruthtuff, 2004; this may be synonymous with the view of 
immediate competition assuming that semantic processing of the distractors at the point of 
their presentation leads to their competition with targets). Attentional slippage may lead to an 
involuntary re-direction of attention towards the spoken item and then back to the visual 
targets. The consequence of attentional slippage, however, is presumably a greater analysis of 
the distractor, allowing for modality information to be encoded and thereafter used—if 
instructed to do so (e.g., via forewarning)—to edit the item post-retrieval. Processing of 
distractors via attentional leakage is known to occur (e.g., Scott, Rosen, Beaman, Davis & 
Wise, 2009), however, it may not involve further analysis of the irrelevant speech token and 
would therefore be unlikely to facilitate the editing process despite giving rise to erroneous 
recall. Even though attentional capture may underpin intrusion rates, it is unclear why 
attentional capture would leave veridical recall untouched, especially as sound that captures 
attention disrupts target recall in the context of serial short-term memory (e.g., Hughes, 
Vachon, & Jones, 2005, 2007; Hughes, Hurlstone, Marsh, Vachon, & Jones, 2013; Sörqvist, 
2010). Because of this, we favor the view that a breakdown of source monitoring at recall 
rather than attentional capture at study underpins the erroneous recall component of the B-
SSS effect. 
A Functional View of Forgetting 
More broadly, the present findings are in line with a functional approach to forgetting  
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that emphasizes the role of conceptually-focused selective attention (M. C. Anderson, 2003; 
M. C. Anderson & Huddleston, 2012) and monitoring processes in establishing successful 
remembering (Marsh et al., 2008, 2012, 2014). This view eschews the idea that forgetting is 
attributable to passive factors such as decay, interference (e.g., overwriting), or context 
change. Rather, forgetting is not considered in terms of a negative outcome, but as a 
consequence of active inhibitory processes that serve important attentional functions. The 
notion of a conceptually-focused selective attention holds that selective retrieval requires 
similar processes to perceptually focused selective attention whereby one object has to be 
selected from an array of others that receive activation in parallel via perceptual input 
(Houghton & Tipper, 1994). For conceptually-focused selective attention, these objects may 
no longer be within the external world (such as images, facts or prior episodes). Here, 
attention is shifted across objects internally to allow attentional refocusing on the target 
object for mnemonic retrieval. When more than one object shares a retrieval cue such as the 
taxonomic cue “Fruit”, many representations of “Fruit” will receive activation in parallel 
from the cue, only one of which may be the target for memory retrieval, the remainder non-
targets (distractors/competitors). Selectively attending to the target entails isolation of the 
target representation from non-target representations. According to the conceptually-focused 
selective attention view, inhibition is the key process that is used to resolve this 
computational problem of selection. The inhibitory process resolves interference from non-
targets by deactivating the mental representations of these competitors thus rendering them 
non-interfering and allowing the target memory to be retrieved (Anderson & Weaver, 2009). 
This cognitive control mechanism that responds to unwanted competition from related 
memories is functional in that it allows contextually appropriate responses—that are often 
weaker than the unselected alternatives—to be retrieved thereby overriding responses that are 
often prepotent. The result of this suppression, however, is that it carries a negative 
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consequence for the later recall of the competing, non-target, memories should they then 
become the targets for selective retrieval (Anderson, 2003). That omissions of veridical 
recalls were unrelated to incidence of erroneous recall in the present study challenges passive 
theories of forgetting that are based on the constructs of decay or blocking (as we have 
focused on here). The present findings cohere better with the view that distractors compete 
with targets for retrieval and that the executive process of inhibition is required to prevent or 
reduce the competition (M. C. Anderson, 2003). Impairment in veridical recall therefore, is 
not related to the degree to which distractors are erroneously recalled at retrieval but rather to 
a cost of the immediate competition offered by those distractors during their presentation and 
the inhibitory process deployed to reduce that competition (Marsh et al., 2008, 2012, 2014). 
 In conclusion, the results reported here suggest that the B-SSS effect on veridical and 
erroneous recall is underpinned by two distinct mechanisms—one that is associated with 
disruption of veridical recall and one that is associated with production of erroneous recall—
that are differentially sensitive to modulation by top-down knowledge about the tendency for 
erroneous recall. Forewarning seems to modulate the erroneous recall component through the 
process of back-end cognitive control, a monitoring process that does not influence veridical 
recall. Although processes relating to discrimination may also influence veridical recall, the 
disruption to veridical recall seems to be related to the direct competition between targets and 
distractors as they occur as well as an overspill of an inhibitory process (Marsh et al., 2008, 
2012, 2014) rather than activation-blocking (Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 
2012; Rundus, 1973).  
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Footnote 
1. Whilst it may seem more intuitive to think of the successful identification of an intrusion 
as an intrusion as a correct rejection, this would technically be incorrect. The ‘signal’ in this 
case (cf. signal detection theory) is an intrusion and hence to classify one as such is a hit and 
failure to classify it as such is a miss. To not classify a target-word as an intrusion is thus a 
correct rejection and to classify a target-word as an intrusion is a false alarm. 
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Figures and Table captions 
 
Figure 1. Panel A: Mean number of related-speech intrusions (for the unrelated and related 
speech trials in the no-warning and warning conditions) of Experiment 1. Panel B: Proportion 
of correct responses (i.e., for unrelated and related speech trials in the no-warning and 
warning conditions) of Experiment 1. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 2. The (absence of) a relation between non-edited veridical recall and erroneous recall 
in the related condition of Experiment 2. 
 
Table 1. The table shows for the unrelated and related sound conditions of Experiment 2 the 
means (M) and standard errors (SE) for the number of times per list a distractor-item was 
output (overt erroneous recall) and also whether that item was classified as an intrusion (i.e., 
a hit), or not classified as an intrusion (i.e., a miss). The table also shows the number of times 
per list a target-item was output (veridical recall) and also whether it was not classified as an 
intrusion (i.e., a correct rejection) or classified as an intrusion (i.e., a false alarm). 
 
  
Erroneous and Veridical Recall       43 
 
Figure 1 
 
A 
  
 
 
B 
            
 
  
Erroneous and Veridical Recall       44 
 
Figure 2 
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Table 1 
 Condition 
                  Unrelated Related 
Dependent variable M           SE M SE 
Erroneous recall 
No. of distractors output regardless of their   0.95                                              
classification 
 
0.19 
 
 
2.01 
 
0.32 
Classified as an intrusion (Hits) 
Not classified as an intrusion (Misses)  
 
0.69     
0.25 
0.16 
0.06 
1.26 
0.75 
0.29 
0.11 
     
Veridical Recall  
No. of targets output regardless of their         8.48                                                                    
classification 
                                            
         0.21 
                                                             
7.97  0.23 
Classified as not an intrusion (Correct 
rejections)  
8.23 0.19 7.45 0.20 
Classified as an intrusion (False 
alarms) 
0.25 0.06 0.52 0.12 
 
 
